Does it make sense to use the concept of citizenship beyond the borders of the nation-state? Political theorists debate about this question. I will present both sides of the debate in the following two lectures. In the first lecture, I will focus on the arguments against the current version of the European citizenship in political theory. In the second lecture, I will answer the criticism. Several Neo-Republican political theorists like David Miller or Richard Bellamy consider European citizenship as purely procedural and without substance. Procedural citizenship is citizenship considered as a legal status defined by a set of rights and responsibilities. This view takes into account the increasing social and cultural pluralism of modern societies. On the other hand, a theory of substantial citizenship considers that citizenship requires a common identity, an expression of one's membership in a political community. It presupposes shared values and a shared civic culture. For Neo-Republicans, the EU lacks something really important, namely, democratic legitimacy. For David Miller, "unless the several groups that compose a society have the mutual sympathy that stems from a common nationality, it will be virtually impossible to have free institutions." Richard Bellamy also argues that a free society should be self-governing, or at least benefit from a fair representative system where politicians have equal concern and equal respect for the citizens. "Such arrangement create a condition of civic freedom in which citizens are neither dominated nor dominate." This is at the heart of the Neo-Republican critique of the EU. On this account, building a European people requires that citizens deliberate and decide together. Citizenship is active. Yet, according to Richard Bellamy, EU citizenship is not a status of full membership in a political community because the decision-making process has been relocated beyond the national scale, allowing like-minded elites to formulate policies away from the people. For Richard Bellamy calling EU citizenship, ''citizenship'', as such is thus a misnomer. More generally, Neo-Republican political theorists oppose what they see as a dangerous myth associated with liberal politics. I will thus focus now on the critique which maintains that European integration threatens democratic legitimacy and even the support for the welfare state. For David Miller, again, the rights of citizenship must be embedded in the moral relationships of shared nationality. Nationality is considered as the cement of society. Embracing equalitarian views and a distributive conception of social justice implies that the well-off feel ''bound to the beneficiaries by strong ties of community.'' David Miller is thus pessimistic about the prospects of EU citizenship. What we owe to each other in social security schemes cannot be achieved between European citizens who do not trust each other in the same way as national citizens do. But there is more. On the Neo Republican account, the current version of EU citizenship is dismissed for three main reasons. First, the market-oriented nature of EU citizenship. For the French law professor, Julien Barroche, for instance, goods and persons should not be subject to the same legal framework. For Joseph Weiler too, European citizenship should not be just a market citizenship. The European citizen should not simply be understood as a consumer of goods and rights. On this account, there is an issue with EU citizenship because the EU favors mobile citizens who move from one member state to another and benefit from freedom of movement over citizens who stay in their place of residence. On this ground, the mobility of human resources in the EU is intended to fluidify the workplace market, but little attention is paid to individuals being anchored in and attached to their local communities. Here is the objection. One should exert one's right to European citizenship to benefit from its privilege. The Neo-Republican argument also attacks the role of the European Court of Justice, ECG. The ECG has appropriated the prerogatives of a federal court. It has thus driven the process of moving from a citizenship based on cross-border movement to a citizenship based on residency. The result is that both the single market and the EU case law has wiped out a notion of citizenship worthy of the name. For Richard Bellamy, I quote, "The ECG has misconstrued Union citizenship as if it consisted of a set of human rights to participation in the spontaneously arising and self-sustaining free market. Rather than being grounded in the mutual recognition of the rights of citizens within an association of democratic states." The second critique focuses on the non-political nature of EU citizenship. At the EU level, political rights remain inconsistent. These political rights are rather civil rights. We can mention diplomatic and consular protection, the right to petition and the right to mediator, and the right to communicate with the institutions of the Union. The only rights that are really political in the strictest sense, are the right to vote for the European Parliament, and to stand in local and European elections. But even if these rights exist, the bad turnout at European elections shows how little people are really involved in these matters. Political parties remain embedded in national systems and Pan-European mobilization is weak. This is really critical for Neo-Republican scholars. The decoupling of citizenship from nationality undermines the sovereignty of the people. For David Miller, to ensure the government pursues the public interests rather than sectional interests, citizens must conceive themselves as a public. This is the meaning of David Miller's nationality thesis and of his critique of rights-based citizenship. We can apply it to cosmopolitan citizenship, but also to the EU. EU citizens are not defined through their participation in decision-making or their public spirits, but rather as subjects entitled with individual rights. This is one of the main criticism of the EU. It reinforces the legal subject, but to the detriment of the citizen who exerts his or her sovereignty, rules on various issues and determines his or her future within the framework of a conflictual democracy. The third and final argument may be the strongest. There is no European demos. For many Neo-Republicans, a political community needs to be fairly homogeneous and possess a conscious will to implement common projects. Therefore, the defining criteria of citizenship are shared history and culture on the grounds that people who share such characteristics are more likely to feel mutual obligations of solidarity. On this record, according to Richard Bellamy for instance, there is no European people sharing a common identity and the public sphere. Richard Bellamy supports the no demos thesis with regard to the EU. A people for Richard Bellamy is understood in a specifically political sense, I quote, "To refer to a group of persons who regard themselves as forming a political community that is capable of self-government." Finally, for David Miller and Richard Bellamy, the effective dimension of citizenship cannot be neglected. Identity cannot be captured in terms of reason only. What is at stake behind modern citizenship is not a matter of status or the bestowing of individual rights and freedoms, but a matter of function where active members of the political community feel like, we the people. Being a full member of a democratic political entity is much more than a matter of reason and rights. Nevertheless, the Neo- Republican critique tends to underestimate the true benefits of EU citizenship, according to other political theorists, which I will present in the next lecture.
