During the operational phase there are three key risks that the Special Purpose Vehicle faces; And in this session we try to analyze how these risks can be allocated to the parties that are working with the SPV in the project finance. The three key risks that we will analyze are the demand risk, or market risk, the operational risk, the risk of operations, and supply risk. I will start exactly from this one. Typically, in the project finance that triggers industrial projects one of the key elements is the fact that the SPV is exposed possibly to the risk to run short in terms of raw material that is necessary to run the project. In this case, one of the most useful solutions is to enter in an agreement with one, or a very small number of suppliers, whereby suppliers commit themselves to provide a certain quantity of raw material at certain specific dates with specific quality and at a predefined price. In addition to this basic obligation, these kinds of contracts that are typically known as put or pay agreement require something stronger to the supplier. And, in particular, the supplier will be required, in case the supplier is not able to provide the base raw material, to find alternative sources of supply. And, in case this alternative source is more expensive than the original one, to bear the cost. You can understand, then, why these contracts are called put or pay. In normal cases, you put. If you are not able to put, you will pay, the SPV, the difference. So that the risk is completely shifted away from the SPV to the supplier. The second key risk during the operational phase, is the operational risk. Operational risks are is the risk due to malfunctioning, bad procedures, not careful maintenance of the plants and the equipment, and you can understand that the responsibility for this kind of activity typically is on the shoulders of the operation and maintenance agreement. And at the operational and maintenance agent. If this is true, what is typically done in project finance is to ask some form of responsibility to the operation and maintenance agreement, so that if the O&M agent is not performing at the specified, prespecified service level agreement. He will have to refund the SPV for the loss incurred due to a lower performance than the performance that has been agreed in the O&M service. In this case, you can also understand that if the O&M is made responsible for refunding the SPV for every sub performance that the plant is experiencing, this counterpart will have to pay sums that are proportional to the damage that has been created to the SPV. And, again, using these kind of contracts, you can shift the risk from the SPV to one of the key counterparties of the SPV itself. The third important risk that unfortunately cannot be completely covered in project finance. Take, for example, the cases of project finances that sell goods or services to a retail public, is to enter an agreement with one or a very small number of big buyers of the products that the SPV will be able to generate. A normal contract of this kind typically is a long term agreement, whereby the SPV commits to provide supplies to the single buyer. It is also known as the off-taker. And the off-taker is committing itself to pay the price that has been predetermined inside of the contract. Typical characteristics of this contract, however, must protect the SPV against the possibility that for whatever circumstance the off-taker is not able to withdraw the production from the SPV. So, the typical story is, the SPV has goods or services to be provided and, for whatever reason, the off-taker is not able to withdraw this kind of production. In this case, these kinds of contracts, that are typically known as take or pay agreements, provides that if the off taker is not able to withdraw the production, he will pay, unconditionally, the price to the SPV. So, in any case, I will pay the price, even if I don't withdraw the production. In case I pay the price and I do not withdraw the production, the SPV is open to sell goods or services on the free market, and the price that is being paid by the off taker will be considered as a down payment for future supplies by the SPV to the off taker itself. So, you can appreciate that, overall, using this sort of umbrella protection during the operational phase, the SPV is insulated from the key risks that the SPV will be experiencing. I have two final remarks for you. The first one, one could wonder, but, at the end of the day, you are covering risk entering agreements with these kinds of counterparties. Can't you face another risk, which is counterparty risk? The risk that this party will not be able to be able to sustain this kind of obligations. The answer is, absolutely so. And, in fact, what analysts typically do in project finance is, also, to understand the soundness of these counterparties. You don't do project finance if the counterparties are not more than stable and financially sound. The second element that I want to remind you is, creditors typically require that all the counterparties of the vehicle can be substituted in case they are not able to withstand their obligations. They typically underwrite the so called direct agreements with every single counterparty so that if the counterpart is not able to perform as expected, creditors can go directly to the counterpart and ask for the substitution of this counterpart. With another party that has agreed with the creditors and that is appreciated by the creditors themselves. You can appreciate that at the end of this stage, you can really appreciate that the SPV will be pretty much protected against the emergence of these kind of risks.